The moral law

In my last post I discussed the solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma. It so happens that a parallel dilemma can be constructed for ourselves. Do we approve of an action because it is good or is an action good because we approve of it?

For morality to be objective it must be based on something other than subjective opinion. In the case of humans, that something is human nature [1]. What distinguishes us from the rest of the animal kingdom is our capability for rational thought. Unlike other animals, which automatically act on instinct to survive, we face a choice - to live or to die. To live (and flourish) is the value that bridges the gap from the "is" of human nature to the "ought" of morality. [2]

An analogy may be helpful here. Medicine is a normative science based on physiology which presupposes the value of health. Ignoring facts about physiology leads to poor health. Similarly, morality is based on human nature and presupposes the value of life and well-being. Ignoring facts about human nature leads to misery for ourselves and society.

Normative terms such as "moral", "virtuous", "good", "bad", "evil" and so on derive their meaning from the choices we make in ordinary, everyday contexts (with well-being as the standard of value). There is substantial agreement across cultures about the content of morality, as evidenced by the widespread injunctions against murder, violence, theft and so on, and in commonly found maxims such as the Golden Rule. [3] Differences that we do find can be recognized as one of degree rather than as being moralities of a radically different kind. [4]

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[1] For theists, human nature is usually understood to reflect God's nature which allows the moral law to be discoverable. Otherwise, as C.S.Lewis says, "If we once admit that what God means by "goodness" is sheerly different from what we judge to be good, there is no difference left between pure religion and devil worship." (From the "The Poison of Subjectivism" in "Christian Reflections".)

[2] In Aristotelian terms, humans are rational animals and human flourishing (eudaimonia) is the final cause (telos) that grounds moral actions. We can see precursors to value, purpose and choice in an animal's survival instinct. But value, purpose and choice are intentional terms that derive their literal meaning from their use in everyday human contexts.

[3] See the appendix of "The Abolition of Man" where C.S.Lewis presents textual evidence of a universal moral law across modern and ancient cultures.

[4] C.S.Lewis discusses this point in "The Poison of Subjectivism". He notes that the Nietzschean ethic is innovative not because it grounds a different kind of morality but because it rejects objective morality altogether. That is, Nietzsche accepts the subjective horn of the dilemma.

Euthyphro's Dilemma

In "The Poison of Subjectivism", C.S.Lewis asks, "But how is the relation between God and the moral law to be represented? To say that the moral law is God's law is no final solution. Are these things right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right?" [1]

This is the modern version of the dilemma first posed by Socrates in Plato's "Euthyphro". Lewis explains why he is unable to accept either horn of the dilemma.

"If the first, if good is to be defined as what God commands, then the goodness of God Himself is emptied of meaning and the commands of an omnipotent fiend would have the same claim on us as those of the "righteous Lord." If the second, then we seem to be admitting a cosmic dyarchy, or even making God himself the mere executor of a law somehow external and antecedent to His own being. Both views are intolerable."

Be that as it may, rejecting the dilemma is not a valid option here. In essence, the question posed is whether God's morality is subjective or objective and there is no middle ground between these two alternatives. [2] However, Lewis' concern with the "objective" horn of the dilemma turns out to be unfounded. An objective law need not be external and antecedent to the being that follows it.

To see this, consider the economic law of supply and demand. The truth of this law depends on the actual interactions between people. The law did not precede the existence of people since it depends on what people do. But neither did anyone create the law. Instead it is a discovered generalization of people's behavior. That is, the law of supply and demand describes what people do or, to phrase it differently, people act according to the law of supply and demand. [3] The law is objective rather than subjective because it exists independently of anyone's opinions about it albeit, in this case, not independently of people's behavior.

Similarly the existence of the moral law for God is conditional on God's nature and therefore not antecedent or external to it. Given God's nature, it prescribes what God should and should not do. That is, God is subject to the moral law which he did not create but which nonetheless depends on his existence. Adding the premise that "God is (always) good", the moral law also describes what God does and does not do. As Lewis says elsewhere, "... the Divine Will is the obedient servant to the Divine Reason." [4]

Note: The solution to the dilemma involves other philosophical issues which I haven't explored here but which I take a generally Aristotelian approach to. These include the problem of universals (what does it mean for abstractions, such as the moral law, to exist?), the is-ought problem (how does the moral law derive from a being's nature?) and the argument from morality (does the moral law require God?).

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[1] "The Poison of Subjectivism" from "Christian Reflections" by C.S.Lewis.

[2] Lewis is aware that he doesn't have a satisfactory solution to the dilemma. He says, "But it is probably just here that our categories betray us. It would be idle, with our merely mortal resources, to attempt a positive correction of our categories - ambulavi in mirabilibus supra me." (Translation: I do exercise myself in great matters, in things too high for me.) However, despite his rejection of the dilemma in this instance, Lewis' general tenor in this essay and other writings is toward the "objective" horn.

[3] The law of supply and command is usually thought of as being true all else being equal. So, for example, when demand increases for a fixed supply of oil, government regulation could prevent the price from rising.

[4] Letter from C.S.Lewis to John Beversluis a few months before his death in 1963. From "C.S.Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion", p295, John Beversluis.

Liberalism's divide

In the US, a wedding photographer was found to be in breach of New Mexico's anti-discrimination law, and fined $6,600, when she refused (on religious grounds) to be the photographer for a same-sex wedding. It follows a similar case where a baker was fined for refusing to make a cake for a same-sex wedding.

The cases raise several issues. For example, does the ruling infringe the business owner's right to free expression (or free association or religious belief)? Also to what extent should the state be involved in deciding these matters? In the US, religious pastors are exempt from performing same-sex weddings. But how does that differ in principle from the above cases?

In the liberal intellectual tradition, the conventional divide has been between classical (free market) liberalism and welfare (redistributionist) liberalism. In recent decades, with the collapse of socialism and the shift toward market-based reform around the world, that division is no longer quite as fundamental as it was.

However there is another historical division regaining prominence, which is between pluralist and rationalist liberalism. Pluralist liberalism is skeptical of the central state and friendly towards local, traditional and voluntary communities and associations. Whereas rationalist liberalism is committed to intellectual progress, universalism and equality before a unified law and is keen to disrupt what it sees as local tyrannies in religious and ethnic groups.

The anti-discrimination cases are examples of disputes across the pluralist/rationalist divide. On the one side, liberal rationalists are arguing that the state should ensure equal treatment before the law, on the other side liberal pluralists are arguing for religious diversity and autonomy (for various reasons, while I support same-sex marriage, I side with the pluralists for the two described cases).

Jacob T. Levy (Professor of Political Theory at McGill University) has written a book that explores this liberal divide since the Enlightenment (entitled "Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom", 2014 - the first three chapters are here). He points out that many of the problems we find today about multiculturalism, religious freedom and freedom of associations are really just the recent manifestations of this deep and perennial divide. That is, one side is inclined toward the use of state power to protect individuals from local group power, the other is inclined to see groups as the results of individual free choice and the protectors of freedom against state power. It's also worth noting that both groups and the state have some general tendencies to impair freedom and the book seeks to identify the patterns.

Calvin and Pink

As part of a discussion on Calvinism and free will, I read A.W. Pink's 1928 essay titled "God's Sovereignty and the Human Will". He defended three theses, one of which seems sensible and two that don't.

1. People's beliefs and actions have their cause in their nature and motivations (Pink gives his examples of motivations such as "the logic of reason, the voice of conscience, the impulse of the emotions, the whisper of the tempter, the power of the Holy Spirit"). I think his basic point is right. We don't make our choices in a vacuum. You choose to open your umbrella because you don't want to get wet. You choose to tell the truth because you believe it is the right thing to do (or perhaps don't because you're trying to avoid getting in some trouble).

2. People do not choose the good and they lack any ability to do so. This denies the common experience of the good things that people often do. The Calvinist response is to either deny that those things are actually good or else state that they are outwardly good but lack any good motivation. Both responses seem to assume their conclusion by appealing to the agent's apparently unobservable "true" nature and motivation.

3. People have no ability to choose the good and they are morally responsible for not choosing the good. This also seems clearly wrong. Consider an analogous situation where you discover that a small child is drowning and that there is no way to save him except by swimming out to him. However, you can't swim and so he drowns. Can you be morally responsible for not saving him?